Abstract: Generalized signcryption (GSC) can adaptively work as an encryption scheme, a signature scheme or a signcryption scheme with only one algorithm. It is more suitable for the storage constrained setting. In this paper, motivated by Paterson-Schuldt's scheme, based on bilinear pairing, we first proposed an identity based generalized signcryption (IDGSC) scheme in the standard model. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first scheme that is proven secure in the standard model.
Introduction
Confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and authentication are the important requirements for many cryptographic applications. A traditional approach to achieve these requirements simultaneously is to sign-then-encrypt or encrypt-then-sign. To enhance efficiency, Zheng [1] proposed the concept of signcryption in 1997. The main idea of this primitive is to perform signature and encryption simultaneously in a logical step. Compared with traditional methods [2] , signcryption reduces the computational costs and communication overheads. Since then, many public key signcryption schemes have been proposed [3] [4] [5] .
In 1984, Shamir [6] first proposed the idea of identity-based (ID-based) public key cryptography (ID-PKC) to simplify key management procedures of traditional certificate-based public key cryptography. The main idea of ID-PKC is that the user's public key can be calculated directly from his/her identity such as email addresses rather than being extracted from a certificate issued by a certificate authority (CA). Private keys are generated for the users by a trusted third party, called a Private Key Generator (PKG) using some master key related to the global parameters for the system. The direct derivation of public keys in ID-PKC eliminates the need for certificates and some of the problems associated with them. The first identity based signature scheme was given by Shamir [6] , but the first identity based encryption scheme was presented by Boneh and Fanklin [7] in 2001. The first identity based signcryption scheme was proposed by Malone Lee [8] in 2002, and they also gave the security model for signcryption in identity based settings. Since then, many identity based signcryption schemes have been proposed [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] .
The signcryption scheme was used in these application environments, which need simultaneous confidentiality and authenticity. However, it is not all application environments requiring both confidentiality and authenticity. If only one of the two functionalities is required, then the signcryption scheme is not efficient. To achieve this, we can use an encryption/signature scheme. However, in the low bandwidth environment, we have to afford to use three different cryptographic algorithms-encryption, signature and signcryption-to achieve confidentiality and authenticity separately or simultaneously. In 2006, to decrease implementation complexity, Han et al. [18] proposed the concept of generalized signcryption, which can work as an encryption scheme or a signature
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem
Given g, g a , g b ∈ G 1 , for unknown a, b ∈ Z * q , compute g ab . The success probability δ of a polynomial algorithm A in solving the CDH problem is denoted as Succ CDH A = Pr[A(g, g a , g b ) = g ab , ] ≥ δ where the probability is over the randomly chosen a, b and the random bits consumed by A.
Definition 2. The (t, δ) CDH assumption holds if no t-time adversary has at least δ in solving the CDH problem.
Formal Model of Identity-Based Generalized Signcryption Schemes

Generic Scheme
An identity based generalized signcryption scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
• Setup: Given a security parameter k, the private key generator (PKG) generates system parameters params and a master key s. params is made public while s is kept secret.
• Extract: Given an identity ID, the PKG computes the corresponding private key d ID and transmits it to the ID via a secure channel.
• Generalized Signcrypt: Given the sender's identity ID A and private key d A , the receiver's identity ID B and a message m, the sender outputs the ciphertext σ.
• Generalized Unsigncrypt: Given the sender's identity ID A , the receiver's identity ID B and private key d B and the ciphertext σ, the receiver with identity ID B outputs m or the symbol ⊥ if σ is an invalid ciphertext under ID A and ID B .
There is no special sender (or receiver) when we encrypt (or sign) a message using IDGSC. We denote the absence of sender (or receiver) by ID Φ . If ID B = ID Φ , the IDGSC scheme becomes a signature scheme and output of the IDGSC is a signature of sender ID A on the message m. If ID A = ID Φ , the IDGSC scheme becomes an encryption scheme and output of the IDGSC is merely an encryption of message m for receiver ID B . If ID A = ID Φ and ID B = ID Φ , then IDGSC works as the signcryption scheme and output of IDGSC is the signcryption of message m for sender ID A and receiver ID B . Thus, the IDGSC scheme works in three models via signcryption mode, encryption mode and signature mode.
Security Model
According to Yu et al.'s scheme [21] , the abilities of an adversary are formally modeled by queries issued by adversities. Each adversary may issue the following queries:
• Private-Key-Extract: The adversary submits an identity, and the challenger responds with the private key of that identity.
• Sign: The adversary submits a sender's identity and a message, and the challenger responds with the signature of the signer on the message.
• Verify: The adversary submits a signer's identity and a message/signature pair, and the challenger responds with 1 if the signature is accepted and 0 otherwise.
• Encrypt: The adversary submits a receiver's identity and a message, and the challenger responds with the ciphertext on this message for the receiver.
• Decrypt: The adversary submits a receiver's identity and a ciphertext, and the challenger decrypts the ciphertext under the private key of the receiver and returns the corresponding plaintext.
• Signcrypt: The adversary submits a sender's and receiver's identities and a message, and the challenger responds with the ciphertext under the sender's private key and the receiver's public key.
• Unsigncrypt: The adversary submits a ciphertext and a receiver's identity, and the challenger decrypts the ciphertext under the private key of the receiver and verifies that the resulting decryption is a valid message/signature pair under the public key of the decrypted identity. Then, the challenger returns the message.
The identity based generalized signcryption can work in three modes: encryption mode, signature mode and signcryption mode, denoted IDGSC-EN, IDGSC-SG and IDGSC-SC, respectively.
For the confidentiality, we define the following two games (Game 1 and Game 2) under IDGSC-EN and IDGSC-SC, respectively.
Game 1. Indistinguishability (IND)-(IDGSC-EN)-CCA2 Secure
Consider the following game played between a challenger C and an adversary A.
• Initial: The challenger C takes security parameters k and runs the Setup algorithm to generate system parameters params and the master key s. C sends params to A and keeps s secret.
• Phase 1: The adversary A can perform a polynomially bounded number of seven above types of queries. These queries may be made adaptively, i.e., each query may depend on the answers to the previous queries. 
Game 2. IND-(IDGSC-SC)-CCA2 Secure
• Phase 1: The adversary A can perform a polynomially bounded number of the seven types of queries above. These queries may be made adaptively, i.e., each query may depend on the answers to the previous queries. For the unforgeability, we define the following two games (Game 3 and Game 4) under IDGSC-SG and IDGSC-SC, respectively.
Game 3. EF-(IBGSC-SG)-Adaptive Chosen Message Attack (ACMA) Secure
• Initial: The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and obtains system parameters params and the master secret key s. C sends params to A. 
Definition 5 (Unforgeability-IDGSC-SG).
An IDGSC scheme is said to have the existential unforgeability against chosen adaptive message attacks (EF-(IDGSC-SG)-ACMA) if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in Game 3.
Game 4. EF-(IDGSC-SC)-ACMA Secure
The Proposed Scheme
Our IDGSC scheme is described as the following algorithms.
• Setup: Given a security parameter k, the PKG chooses groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order q, a generator g of G 1 , a admissible bilinear pairing e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 , and hash functions H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l and H m : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n m . The PKG chooses a random value α ∈ Z * q , computes g 1 = g α and selects g 2 ∈ G 1 . Furthermore, the PKG computes z = e(g 1 , g 2 ) and picks u , m ∈ G 1 and vectors u = {u i }, m = {m i } of length n u and n m , respectively, whose entries are random elements from G 1 . The system parameters are params = {G 1 , G 2 , e, p, g, g 1 , g 2 , H, H m , z, u , m , u, m} and the master secret key g α 2 .
Let f (ID) be a special function, where
• Extract: Let ID be a bit string of length n u , representing an identity and let ID[i] be the i-th bit of ID. Define U ID ⊂ {1, 2, · · ·, n u } to be the set of indices i such that ID[i] = 1. A private key d ID for identity ID is generated as follows. The PKG picks r ID ∈ Z * q and computes
Therefore, the sender with identity ID A and the receiver with identity ID B private keys are
• Generalized Signcrypt: Suppose the sender A with identity ID A wants to send a message m ∈ {0, 1} l to the receiver B with identity ID B , A picks randomly r ∈ Z * q and does the following:
Here π is an n m bit string and π[j] denotes the j-th bit of π, and M ⊂ {1, 2, · · ·, n m } denotes the set of j for which
The ciphertext is σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , σ 4 , c).
• Generalized Unsigncrypt: When receiving σ, the receiver with identity ID B follows the steps below: 3 , w) and generate the corresponding set M, the set of all j for which π[j] = 1. 5. Accepted the message if and only if the following equality holds:
Remark 1. Our Setup, Extract algorithm in our scheme is from the existing work, i.e., Paterson-Schuldt's scheme [25] . However, our Setup algorithm has some differences from [25] , and we added some parameters: H and H m . Other algorithms such as Generalized Signcrypt and Generalized Unsigncrypt are new designs.
Analysis
Correctness
There are three cases to be considered.
Case 1. In the IDGSC-SC Model
In this case, there is
The generalized signcryption scheme in signcryption model is as follows:
• Signcrypt:
• Unsigncrypt: • Sign:
Here π is an n m bit string and π[j] denotes the j-th bit of π , and M ⊂ {1, 2, · · ·, n m } denotes the set of j for which
The signature is σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , σ 4 , c ⊕ H(w)) = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , σ 4 , m).
• Verify: • Encrypt:
Here π is an n m bit string and π[j] denotes the j-th bit of π [j] , and M ⊂ {1, 2, · · ·, n m } denotes the set of j for which
• Decrypt: 
Security Proof
Theorem 1. (Confidentiality in the IDGSC-EN model) Assume there is an adversary IND (IBGSC-EN) CCA2
A that is able to distinguish two valid ciphertexts during the defined in Game 1 with an advantage ε when running in a time t, then there exists an algorithm D that can break Waters' identity based encryption scheme in a time t = t with an advantage ε = ε.
Proof. When the IDGSC scheme works as an encryption scheme, it is a actually the identity based encryption proposed by Waters [26] and one-time signature. Owing to the theorem proposed by Canetti et al. [27] , this scheme is secure against the normal adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack. Considering the signcrypt/unsigncrypt query, the adversary cannot transform the target encryption ciphertext into a valid signcryption ciphertext. This conclusion is based on the EF-ACMA security of PS. So IDGSC scheme in encryption model is IND-CCA2 secure. Thus, the theorem follows.
Theorem 2. (Confidentiality in the IDGSC-SC model). Assume there is an adversary IND (IDGSC-SC) CCA2
A that is able to distinguish two valid ciphertexts during the defined in Game 2 with an advantage ε when running in a time t and making at most q k private key extract queries, q s sign queries, q v verify queries, q e encrypt queries, q d decrypt queries, q sc signcrypt queries and q us unsigncrypt queries. Then, there exists a distinguisher that can solve an instance of the DBDH problem in a time t = t + (5q k + 2q s + 4q e + 4q sc )t e + (4q d + 7q us + 4q v )t p with an advantage ε = ε 8(q k +q d +q s +q sc +q us )(n u +1)q sc (n m +1)
, where t e denotes the time of an exponentiation in G 1 and t p denotes the time of a pairing in (G 1 , G 2 ).
Proof. Assume that there is a polynomially bounded adversary A that is able to break the semantic security of our scheme. Then, there exists a distinguisher D that can decide whether Z = e(g, g) abc or not with a non-negligible advantage when receiving a random instance g, g a , g b , g c , Z. D runs A as the subroutine and acts as the challenger in Game 2 and interacts with A as described below.
• Initial. D chooses randomly as follows:
1. Two integers 0 l u q and 0 l m q. 2. Two integers 0 k u n u and 0 k m n m ( l u (n u + 1) < q, l m (n m + 1) < q).
3. An integer x ∈ Z l u and n u -dimensional vector (x 1 , · · ·, x n u ) ∈ Z l u .
4. An integer y ∈ Z l m and n m -dimensional vector (y 1 , · · ·, y n m ) ∈ Z l m .
5. An integer z ∈ Z q and n u -dimensional vector (z 1 , · · ·, z n u ) ∈ Z q . 6. An integer ω ∈ Z q and n m -dimensional vector (ω 1 , · · ·, ω n m ) ∈ Z q .
To make the notation easy to follow, we define four functions:
D sets system parameters as follows:
, which means that, for any identity ID,
, which means that, for any π, we have
Finally, D returns all parameters to A. We can see that all distributions are identical to that in the real world.
• Phase 1. D answers the queries as follows:
-Private key extract queries: When the adversary A issues a private key extract query on an identity ID, D acts as follows:
1. If F(ID) = 0 mod l u , D aborts and reports failure. 2. If F(ID) = 0 mod l u , D can construct a private key by picking a random r ID ∈ Z * q and computing: • Challenge. After a polynomially bounded number of queries, the adversary A ID * A , ID * B on which he wishes to be challenged. Note that D fails if A has made a private key extract query on ID * D randomly chooses a number r * ∈ Z * q and computes
Otherwise, D sets the ciphertext as:
• Phase 2. The adversary A then performs a second series of queries which are treated in the same as Phase 1. It is not allowed to make the private key extract query on ID * B and an unsigncrypt query on σ * under ID * B .
• Guess. At the end of the simulations, the adversary A outputs a guess γ . If γ = γ, D answers 1, indicating that Z = e(g, g) abc ; otherwise, D answers 0 to the DBDH problem.
This completes the description of simulation. Analyzing the probability of D not aborting still needs to be analyzed. D will not abort if all the following conditions are fulfilled:
1. F(ID) = 0 mod l u during the private key extract queries. 2. F(ID B ) = 0 mod l u during the decrypt queries. 3. F(ID A ) = 0 mod l u during the sign queries. 4. F(ID A ) = 0 mod l u during the signcrypt queries. 5. F(ID B ) = 0 mod l u during the unsigncrypt queries. 6. F(ID * B ) = 0 mod q and K(M * γ ) = 0 mod q during the challenge phase.
Let ID 1 , · · ·, ID q ID be the identity appearing in all queries not involving the challenge identity. Clearly, we will have q ID q k + q d + q s + q sc + q us . Define the following events:
The success probability of D is Pr
The functions F and K are selected independently; therefore, the events (
A i ∧ B) and C are independent. According to l u (n u + 1) < q, it is easy to see that F(u) = 0 mod q ⇒ F(u) = 0 mod l u . Furthermore, this implies that, if F(u) = 0 mod l u , there will be a unique k u with 0 k u n u , such that F(u) = 0 mod q. For the randomness of k u , x , x 1 , · · ·, x n u , we have
).
On the other hand, for any i, the event A i and B are independent, so we have
Similarly, we have Pr
If the simulation does not abort, the adversary A will win Game 2 with the advantage at least ε. Thus, D can solve for the DBDH problem instance with the advantage ε = ε 8(q k +q d +q s +q sc +q us )(n u +1)q sc (n m +1)
. Algorithm D's running time is the same as A's running time plus the time it takes to respond to q k private key extract queries, q s sign queries, q v verify queries, q e encrypt queries, q d decrypt queries, q sc signcrypt queries and q us unsigncrypt queries. Each private key extract query requires five exponentiation operations in G 1 . Each sign query needs two exponentiation operations in G 1 . Each verify query needs four pairing operations in (G 1 , G 2 ). Each encrypt query needs four exponentiation operations in G 1 . Each decrypt query needs four pairing operations in (G 1 , G 2 ). Each signcrypt query requires four exponentiation operations in G 1 . Each unsigncrypt query requires seven pairing operations in (G 1 , G 2 ). If we assume each that exponentiation takes time t e and each pairing takes time t p , the total running time is at most t + (5q k + 2q s + 4q e + 4q sc )t e + (4q d + 7q us + 4q v )t p . Thus, the theorem follows.
Theorem 3.
(Unforgeability in the IDGSC-SG Model) Assuming that there is an adversary EF (IDGSC-SG) ACMA A that breaks our scheme with the probability δ when running in a time t, then there exists an algorithm B that can forge a valid signature of Paterson-Schuldt in a time t = t with the probability δ = δ.
Proof. When the IDGSC scheme works as a signature scheme, it is actually the identity based signature proposed by Paterson and Schuldt [25] . This signature scheme itself is EF-ACMA secure. Considering the signcrypt/unsigncrypt query that is absent in the normal signature scheme, these queries are useless to the adversary of EF-(IDGSC-SG)-ACMA. The identities of sender and receiver are included in the signature. Hence, an adversary can break the Paterson and Schuldt scheme if he can break our scheme in the signature model. Then, the theorem follows.
Theorem 4.
(Unforgeability in the IDGSC-SC Model) Assume that there is an adversary EF (IDGSC-SC) ACMA A that breaks our scheme with the probability δ when running in a time t and making at most q k private key extract queries, q s sign queries, q v verify queries, q e encrypt queries, q d decrypt queries, q sc signcrypt queries and q uc unsigncrypt queries. Then, there exists a algorithm B that can solve an instance of the CDH problem in a time t = t + (5q k + 2q s + 4q e + 4q sc )t e + (4q d + 7q us + 4q v )t p with the probability
Proof. Assume that there is a polynomially bounded adversary A that is able to break the unforgeability of our scheme. Then, there exists an algorithm B that can compute g ab with a non-negligible advantage when receiving a random CDH problem instance (g, g a , g b ) . B runs A as the subroutine and acts as the challenger in Game 4 and interacts with A as described below.
• Initial: B sets the system parameter using the initial phase described in Theorem 1. Note that B assigns g 1 = g a and g 2 = g b . A ) = 0 mod q, F(ID * B ) = 0 mod q and K(π * ) = 0 mod q, B will abort. Otherwise, F(ID * A ) = 0 mod q, F(ID * B ) = 0 mod q and K(π * ) = 0 mod q, B can obtain the following case:
, which is the solution to the given CDH problem.
Analogous to Theorem 1, we can obtain that B solves for the CDH problem instance with the probability δ =
, with time being t = t + (5q k + 2q s + 4q e + 4q sc )t e + (4q d + 7q us + 4q v )t p . Thus, the theorem follows.
Efficiency
We compare the efficiency and security of our scheme with those of three identity based generalized signcryption schemes, including Lal et al.'s scheme [20] , Yu et al.'s scheme [21] and Kushwah et al.'s scheme [22] . We denote the modular exponentiation and the pairing computation by E, P, respectively. Other operations are omitted in the following analysis since their computation cost is trivial. We consider the pre-computation here and do not take hash function evaluations into account.
To compare the computation cost of related schemes, we compute the execution time of the cryptographic operations above using MIRACL [28] , which is a famous cryptographic library and has been widely used to implement cryptographic operations in many environments. Our hardware platform consists of an Intel I7-4770 processor with 3.40 GHz clock frequency, 4 gigabytes memory and runs the Windows 7 operating system. A bilinear pairing P operation needs 4.211 milliseconds and a modular exponentiation E operation needs 1.709 milliseconds.
We summarize the comparisons of the four schemes in Table 1 . The Generalized Signcrypt column and the Generalized Unsigncrypt column demonstrate the computational costs of each identity based generalized signcryption scheme. The Security Model column specifies the security model that the schemes rely on, where RO and SM represent Random Oracle and Standard Model, respectively. Table 1 , in Generalized Signcrypt, the computation cost of our scheme is less than Lal et al.'s scheme [20] and Yu et al.'s scheme [21] and more than Kushwash et al.'s scheme [22] . Our scheme has slightly higher computation costs than other schemes [20] [21] [22] in Generalized Unsigncrypt, whereas our scheme is proven secure in the standard model. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first scheme that is proven secure in the standard model. All previous schemes mentioned above have proven their security on the random oracle model. For some special applications that require very high security, it is believed that only those schemes that can be proven in the standard model must be employed. Thus, our scheme is suitable for secure e-mail and electronic commerce, where the confidentiality and authenticity are simultaneously or separately required to enable a secure and trustable communication environment.
Conclusions
The main purpose of identity based generalized signcryption is to reduce implementation complexity. According to different application environments, identity based generalized signcryption can fulfill the function of identity based signature, encryption or signcryption, respectively. In this paper, we proposed a concrete, ID-based generalized signcryption scheme based on the Paterson-Schuldt scheme. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first ID-based generalized signcryption scheme that can be proven secure in the standard model.
